"If you shut a cat in a room and beat it, it will jump at you"i
By Jonathan Adjemian
On December 20, 2006, fighting broke out in Baidoa, Somalia, between the forces of Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in control of southern Somalia since the previous summer, and Ethiopian troops supporting the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). By the time the news broke in the major American media, around Christmas, the fighting had escalated into a full-scale invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces. Although reports from the ground indicated that many Somalis believed the TFG was receiving backing from the United States, on January 7 it came as a surprise to most Americans when US forces launched the first of two acknowledged air strikes within Somali territory. The first strike, as well as the one that followed on January 9, allegedly targeted Al-Qaeda operatives suspected to be in the region, but over the following days the Pentagon acknowledged that American Special Forces had been on the ground advising Ethiopian troops since the beginning of the invasion.
On January 1, 2007, the ICU was driven from its last stronghold, and the TFG was discussing moving its headquarters from Baidoa to the capital Mogadishu and assuming control of the country. Much of the American media praised the overthrow of an "Islamist regime," while other stories pointed out that the ICU had brought stability to Mogadishu, and other parts of Somalia, that had previously been in civil war for fifteen years, and further questioned the ability of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, under President Abdullahami Yusuf Ahmed, to regain that stability.
Somalia has been synonymous with chaos and anarchy in the Western mind since the overthrow of the repressive regime of autocratic President Siad Barre in 1991, which left the country divided between clan-affiliated warlords and criminal gangs. International intervention failed miserably; after images of Somali militias dragging the corpses of downed American helicopter pilots through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993 (as recounted in the popular book and film "Black Hawk Down") the American public wanted little to do with Somalia.
Now, thirteen years later, Somalia has opened up as the newest front in the Bush administration's "War on Terror." What follows is a brief attempt to explain who the combating parties are, why the US has chosen to involve itself, and what the implications of this "regime change" may be on Somalia, the US, and the ongoing War on Terror.
The Islamic Courts Union
After Barre was driven from power, Mogadishu was divided tenuously between four warlords. Along with fighting in the streets, citizens were subjected to "checkpoints", where militias charged tolls from some of the world’s poorest people to pass through the streets of their own city. A UN report in 2006 found that individual warlords were making up to $4 million each year from this extortion.1 With no central government and no police force, the business community turned to Islamic clerics to establish some kind of stability. Financially supported by business interests, clerics set up a series of Islamic courts to try and sentence criminals under Sharia law. The leadership of each court was established, within the Islamic shura system, by a vote of clerics under its oversight. Over time, these courts spread from Mogadishu across southern Somalia, essentially forming the only legal system in the country.
In 1999, four courts (Ifka Halan, Circolo, Warshadda and Hararyaale) formed a committee to work together, consolidate security forces, and share criminals across clan lines. By the early 2000’s this committee had grown, and an Islamic Courts Union was formed as a militia to protect the courts' interests. The ICU took control of the central market in Mogadishuand began to police some roadways and urban areas.
Two clerics rose to particular prominence in the ICU: Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the chairman, seen as a moderate, and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, head of the shura council, seen as an extremist. Ahmed, a Sudan-educated former secondary school teacher from rural Somalia, was originally elected head of the Islamic court in Jowhad, 90 miles north of Mogadishu. He was elected chair of the Courts Union in July 2004.2 Aweys' involvement in the leadership of the ICU is more recent; during the 1990s he was active in Islamic militias and in 2001 was named a supporter of terrorism by the U.S. Executive and State Department. Although Aweys denies accusations that he supports or harbours Al-Qaeda leadership, he has defended the 9/11 attacks to western reporters and views Osama bin Laden as a freedom fighter.3 In June 2006 he was made leader of the newly formed shura council, a 90-member advisory board responsible for much of the ICU's decision making.4
Transitional Federal Government
Throughout the 1990s, the international community supported various efforts at forming a Somali government, but in the face of clan divisions and civil warfare little progress was made. In 2002 an attempt was made to establish a Somali parliament in Nairobi, Kenya, at a safe distance from the ongoing violence. MPs were drawn equally from seven different clan groups; the idea being to form a transitional government that could establish some stability and pave the way for democratic elections. After two years of deliberations the parliament was formed, and on October 10, 2004, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected president. Although recognized by the U.N., the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) would not exercise any real control in Somalia until December 2006.
Yusuf was a notorious warlord and president of the northern state of Puntland. Prior to the formation of the TFG, Puntland had been a nominally separatist state, and Yusuf had attempted to hold the area under autocratic control. After his first term as president ended in 2001, he staged a coup to regain power and proclaimed himself president, which he remained until elected by the TFG in 2004. He has been accused of brutality in suppressing dissent, and the US State Department, in its 2002 Country report on Somalia, identified Yusuf's private militia as responsible for targeted killings of at least two non-combatant businesses and political opponents.5
Yusuf's opponent in the final runoff was Abdullahi Adow, former Finance minister and ambassador to Washington under the Barre regime. Adow, who had lived in the US for twelve years and then in Dubai for most of the 1990s, was initially seen as the preferred candidate for American and other western interests.6 Siad Barre had played the Cold War to his advantage, allying himself first with the Soviets and then with the Americans, and Adow had maintained many of the international connections he had established during his time in Barre’s government. However, with little support in Somalia (one African reporter called him "a leftover from Siad Barre disguising himself as Hamid Karzai"7), Adow was no match for Yusuf, who had strong military ties to Ethiopia, and was seen as the heaviest thug on the block by the East African press. Yusuf won, 189-79. Rather than choosing a Prime Minister from the TFG, he selected Ali Mohamed Gedi, a former veterinarian with little political experience but with ties to the Ethiopian government.8
Even before he was sworn in, Abdullahi Yusuf called for international support for the new government, requesting 20,000 troops to assist their entry to Mogadishu and assumption of power. When that force was not offered he refused to leave Kenya, believing Mogadishu was too dangerous to enter (he did not enter the capital until January 2007). The speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, supported a move to Mogadishu, and in the spring of 2005 roughly a third of the parliament, under Aden's leadership, established themselves in Mogadishu.9 The TFG would not meet again in its entirety until 2007. Aden came from Mogadishu, as did many of the MPs who left, and had ties to warlords in the capital. He would emerge as the TFG's main voice in support of negotiation, both with the warlords and the ICU.
In May, 2005, after pressure from Kenyan authorities to move on, Yusuf decided to move his government to Baidoa, halfway between Mogadishu and the Ethiopian border. The warlord in control of Baidoa, Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade (himself a member of the TFG), opposed this decision, but after days of fighting (and arguably with Ethiopian support), the TFG forces took Baidoa.10 Many TFG members opposed the move, including the Mogadishu faction, claiming Baidoa was too close to Ethiopia to ensure independent government.
The TFG was not considered a credible force by most Somalis, and the Islamic Courts Union took the move to Baidoa as an Ethiopian threat. They issued a statement threatening war against any nation sending military forces into Somalia.
American Involvement, part 1
The Bush administration saw the rise of the ICU as the beginnings of a new "Islamist state," and with the official government of Somalia powerless, American officials began looking for other groups to support. In February 2006 four Mogadishu warlords came together and formed “The Council for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism” (CRPC), a name that had little to do with their intentions and a good deal to do with currying American favour. Although this unity between warlords did not end the checkpoints or reduce street violence, it did earn them between hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand dollars a month from the CIA, according to John Prendergast, director for African affairs in the Clinton administration and a senior advisor at the non-governmental International Crisis Group.11
In May 2006, the UN Monitoring Council on Somalia, reporting to the Security Council, identified funding and arms to the CRPC coming from Ethiopia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, and Italy, violating an arms embargo on the country in place since 1992. In particular, it cited a shipment of ten metric tons of arms from Ethiopia on March 28, 2006. It also mentioned an unnamed country with "secret involvement", almost certainly the United States.12 At roughly the same time, intense fighting broke out in Mogadishu between the warlords and the Islamic Courts. Abdullahi Yusuf, from Baidoa, issued a statement calling for the United States to work with the "legitimate government" of Somalia rather than "individuals in the capital". At this point almost nothing had reached the international press about external involvement in the Somali conflict, and the response from Undersecretary of State Sean McCormack stated he "was not sure why [Yusuf] had made these comments", and to reassert American intentions of stopping terrorism throughout the Muslim world.13
Even with outside aid, the warlords were gradually beaten back by the ICU, who claimed control of Mogadishu on June 10, 2006. From this point on Mogadishu stabilized to a point that had not been seen since 1991. The checkpoints were abolished, violence was drastically reduced, and litter was collected from the streets for the first time in fifteen years. Western and "indecent" material was banned from radio stations and movie theatres, but most Somalis welcomed the stability. As the BBC reported in May 2005, commenting on the powerlessness of the TFG, split over moving to Mogadishu, "After so many years of bloodshed, many ordinary Somalis do not really care who their leader is, so long as he can provide them with enough security for them to start rebuilding their shattered lives."14
Breakdown
By June 2006, American interests had moved on from the warlords. In a September 10 story Anthony Barnett and Patrick Smith of The Guardian reported leaked correspondence between two private American military firms, Select Armor and ATS International, that showed both had been in talks with Abdullahi Yusuf of the Transitional Government concerning military support for the capture of Mogadishu. Yusuf had long argued that his government was powerless without international support, and the US military firms concurred with Yusuf's analysis. Chris Farina of ATS International wrote "A forced entry operation [into Mogadishu] at this point without the addition of follow-on forces who can capitalize on the momentum/initiative of the initial op will result in a replay of Dien Bien Phu", referring to the battle that saw the French colonial forces defeated in Indochina in 1953.15 It was clear — successful military action by the TFG would require outside support.
Tensions mounted in July as military confrontation seemed likely. The militant Sheikh Aweys was installed as head of the shura council as the ICU restructured itself to govern all of southern Somalia. A taped statement from Osama bin Laden released in July included a call to the Somali people to prepare for war.16 According to the UN Council on Somalia, limited military aid was coming from Eritrea to support the Courts Union. At the same time, the ICU continued to build peacetime infrastructure and restore some level of stability to the region.
On July 20, 2006, as ICU militia units had advanced near Baidoa, a convoy of "dozens" of Ethiopian trucks, including heavily armoured military vans, crossed the border and entered Baidoa, seat of the TFG. Two days later two hundred Ethiopian troops entered the nearby city of Wajid.17 The ICU, in keeping with their earlier statements, declared war on Ethiopia. Tensions were high, but eventually the ICU units backed down. The Ethiopian government denied sending forces into Somalia, and the Islamic Courts claimed their troops had never intended to attack Baidoa, but had been on routing maneuvers in area they controlled.
Peace talks were established between the Islamic Courts and the Transitional government, taking place in Khartoum, Sudan. On September 4, an initial agreement was signed between the two sides. Abdullahi Sheik Ismail, a deputy prime minister in the transitional government, said, "The Islamic courts have met the expectations of our people."18
Two weeks later, on September 18, President Yusuf's convoy was attacked in Baidoa. Although Yusuf escaped unharmed, four others, including his brother, were killed. The TFG blamed the attack on the ICU, who in turn denied and condemned the attack, saying they did not sponsor terrorism. After the attack Yusuf lost any interest in peace talks. On November 1, with no progress made in talks, the ICU broke off negotiations until Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia (the Ethiopians still denied their troops' presence in the country). On November 6, Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Gedi ordered the Mogadishu faction of Parliament, identified as 67 MPs, to rejoin the TFG in Baidoa.19 Violating this order, the group, under the leadership of the speaker of Parliament, Hassan Sheikh Aden, broke ranks with President Yusuf to broker a last-attempt peace deal with Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, chairman of the ICU. Aden and his group of Mogadishu-based MPs signed an accord with the Islamic Courts on November 11 which called for co-operation between the two groups. The deal was condemned by Yusuf from Baidoa. This marked the end both of any hope for a deal between the two sides, and of any co-operation between the President and the Speaker of Parliament.
American Involvement, part 2
In early December, with conflict all but unavoidable, the US approached the United Kingdom to co-sponsor a UN bill calling for a partial suspension of the arms embargo on Somalia, enabling support to the TFG. The UK declined to support the bill. On December 4, Gen. John Abizaid, head of the American CENTCOM, responsible for the horn of Africa as well as the Middle East — the US military currently has no central command specifically for Africa20 — came to Addis Ababa to visit with the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi. A former intelligence officer speaking to Suzanne Goldenberg of The Guardian called this meeting "just the final handshake" on a US-supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia.21 On December 12, the ICU gave Ethiopia an ultimatum to withdraw troops from Somalia within a week. On December 20, fighting broke out in Baidoa, and a day later Sheikh Aweys of the Islamic Courts declared the Courts to be at war with Ethiopia. On December 23, the ICU declared the country open to Muslim jihadists from around the world, saying "we welcome any one who can remove the Ethiopian enemy to enter our country."22
Ethiopia did not officially acknowledge the war until December 24, by which time at least twenty T-55 tanks and four attack helicopters had been brought across the border to join the fighting (none of the forces in Somalia owned any tanks or aircraft of their own). Ethiopian support gave the TFG a decisive edge over the ICU. With the Ethiopian declaration the US moved several military vessels from the Persian Gulf to the Somali coast.
With the Courts Union outmatched, the fighting was over quickly. On December 28 the ICU left Mogadishu, and after defeat at Kismayo on January 1 they had given up all territory. On January 3 Kenya closed and heavily armed its border with Somalia to prevent ICU leaders from escaping (and to block the flood of refugees that had already began).
On January 7, and then again on January 9, the US launched air strikes on Somali territory. The first strike, near the Kenyan border, came from the US force at Djibouti, established in 2002, housing 1,800 American troops. The second hit outside the village of Afmadow. Both strikes were announced as targeting known Al-Qaeda leaders, Abu Taha Al-Sudani and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, as well as Somali terrorist Fazul Abdullah Mohammed. None were killed, but Oxfam reported seventy shepherds had been killed in the first raid, and the UNHCR estimated 100 civilians were killed in the second.23
On January 10, the Pentagon acknowledged the presence of a "small" group of special operations forces supporting and advising Ethiopian and TFG forces from the beginning of the invasion. President Abdullahi Yusuf, in his first press conference since the invasion, supported the American strikes, saying "they have a right to do so."
The new government called on Somalis to voluntarily turn in their weapons, but given their lack of credibility with the populace, this was little more than a symbolic gesture. Militias aligned with Mogadishu warlords began to emerge on the streets again, even though their leaders were officially MPs in the new government.
On January 13, the TFG, still in Baidoa, voted 154-2 to declare martial law. Nearly 125 members were absent, many in Mogadishu, some still in Kenya.
On January 15, Sharif Aden, speaker of Parliament, went to Brussels to meet with EU representatives. He had denounced the invasion, arguing to the BBC at the end of December, “The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia is illegal, it is against the charter of the transitional government. Somalis should resist against Ethiopian troops.”24 The same day, the TFG closed three radio stations (including HornAfrik, and the Shabelle network, both respected East African media networks) and Al-Jazeera television. Ethiopian tanks entered Mogadishu for the first time, although Ethiopia announced it hoped to have its troops out "within weeks".
On January 17, Sharif Aden was deposed by a 183-9 vote of parliament, out of 275 MPs. The same day, after international protest, the media ban was lifted.
On or around January 20, the ICU chairman, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, surrendered himself at the Kenyan border and was taken to Nairobi. The New York Times reported his surrender was conditional on an American promise he would not be deported from Kenya, and quoted EU diplomats saying American officials "were playing an increasingly large behind-the-scenes role in Somalia, pursuing an aggressive counter-terrorism agenda but also trying to shape Somalia’s political future."25 Ahmed remains the most popular political figure in Somalia, leading to speculation of plans to involve him in the new government. Given Ahmed's attempts at negotiation with the TFG, this could raise questions as to the purpose of the invasion.
Consequences
At the time of writing, it is hard to tell what the outcome of the December conflict will be. Chaos and fighting have returned to Mogadishu and most of southern Somalia. A large percentage of Somali citizens are resentful of international interference removing the only regime in fifteen years that had brought stability. The African Union has called for a peacekeeping force, but so far have been unable to receive commitments for the 7 500 to 8 000 troops needed, and with an increasingly visible US involvement this solution seems less and less likely. The warlords who tore apart Somalia are again becoming active. President Yusuf has indicated his intention to return Somaliland, a northern province that declared independence in the early 1990s and has established a democratic government and relative stability, to Somali control.26 And the US has become involved in one more continent in its War on Terror.
It is troubling to see a Cold War mentality emerging — in which the world is divided in two parts, and any government willing to ally itself on the American side can count on aid, regardless of its public support, human rights record, or potential for stability. Yusuf's response to the American air strikes is equally troubling — it is rare to see a leader give another country the "right" to carry out military actions against his country's civilians, and this action does not speak well for his regard for the country he is to lead.
The Islamic Courts, although far from an ideal system of government, succeeded where no other Somali group had. They brought stability to Mogadishu and much of the south. They formed compromises between various factions, hard-line and moderate, and engaged in successful peace talks with elements of the transitional government. The fact that it took international action and arms to unseat the ICU testifies to their broad public support. And, as the London Times' Martin Fletcher noted, "The courts were less repressive than our Saudi Arabian friends. They publicly executed two murderers (a fraction of the twenty-four executions in Texas last year), and discouraged Western dancing, music and films, but at least people could walk the streets without being robbed or killed. That trumps most other considerations. Ask any Iraqi."27
The US policy of supporting anyone but the ICU shows a disregard for Somali well-being, and has the potential of leading to the kind of disaster that Cold War policy produced in Latin America and Southeast Asia. It also shows a lack of understanding of the realities of the Muslim world, where a willingness to apologize for the enemies of America may not indicate radical evil so much as an awareness of history.
Footnotes:
i. Sheikh Yusuf Muhammad Siad Inde'Adde, military chief of the Islamic Courts Union
1. Xan Rice, The wages of chaos, The Guardian, May 31 2006.
2. Hassan Barise, Somalia's modest Islamic leader, BBC News, June 12 2006.
3. Martin Fletcher, How memories of Black Hawk Down cast shadow over hopes for peace, The Independent (UK), December 18 2006.
4. United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), June 26 2006.
5. Somalia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2002, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. State Department (Undersecretary for Democracy and Global Affairs). March 31, 2003.
6. Somalia's presidential hopefuls, BBC News, October 10 2004.
7. Omar Egal, The Man Who Deserves to Be President, Mudulood News, www.mudulood.com, 2002.
8. C. Bryson Hull, Somali premier at core of political crisis, Reuters, August 9 2006.
9. Somali peace under threat, BBC News, May 12 2005.
10. Andrew Meldrum, Somali battle rages over choice of capital, The Guardian, May 31 2005.
11. Xan Rice, Fall of Mogadishu leaves US policy in ruins, The Guardian, June 10 2006.
12. Xan Rice, The wages of chaos, The Guardian, May 31 2006.
13. Emily Wax & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Secretly Backing Warlords, The Washington Post, May 17 2006.
14. Somali peace under threat, BBC News, May 12 2005.
15. Anthony Barett & Patrick Smith, US accused of covert operations in Somalia, The Guardian, September 10, 2006.
16. The US intelligence community at the time rejected the idea of a bin Laden - Somali connection, seeing bin Laden's statement as "part of bin Laden's failing claim to the leadership of a worldwide Islamic movement" (Karen DeYoung, U.S. Sees Growing Threats In Somalia, The Washington Post, December 12 2006).
17. Ethiopian troops on Somali soil, BBC News, July 20 2006.
18. Warring sides in Somalia sign pact, Associated Press, September 5 2006.
19. Aweys Osman Yusuf, Somalia's premier Gedi orders 67 parliamentarians in Mogadishu to return to Baidoa immediately, Shabelle media network, November 7 2006.
20. The Department of Defense has recently announced the creation of a new African Command , but the program is still in development (Pentagon confirms Africa Command, UPI, December 15, 2006).
21. Xan Rice and Suzanne Goldenberg, How US forged an alliance with Ethiopia over invasion, The Guardian, January 13 2007.
22. Aweys Osman Yusuf, Islamists call world Muslim fighters to wage their jihad war in Somalia, Shabelle Media Network, December 23 2006.
23. Anne Penketh & Steve Bloomfield, US strikes on Al-Qa'ida chiefs kill nomads, The Independent (London), January 13 2007.
24. Somalia back at square one, Associated Press, December 29 2006.
25. Jeffrey Gettleman, Leader of Somali Islamists Surrenders, The New York Times, January 22 2006.
26. As president of Puntland, Yusuf engaged in border disputes with Somaliland over the town of Lasonod, officially within Somaliland's borders but claimed by Puntland (Fears of renewed hostility as Col. Abdullahi Yusuf is elected, Somaliland.org news desk, October 13 2004).
27. The Islamists were the one hope for Somalia, The Times Online, January 8 2007.